THIRD DIVISION
IMELDA S. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
- versus - JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR. Respondent. |
A.M.
No. RTJ-06-2011 [formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2083-RTJ]
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The facts that gave rise to the
filing of the present administrative case, as culled from the rollo, follow:
Following the death in
Warrants for the arrest[2] of
Sherwin Que a.k.a. Bungol, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe, Richard Doe, Arnold
Doe, Dexter Doe, James Doe, Robert Doe, and Arthur Doe were thereupon issued by
the Executive Judge of the Cebu RTC.
On the invitation[3] of
the 7th Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group Unit (CIDGU)
at Camp Sotero Cabahug in
An “Inquest Investigation” of Apura was conducted on
Apura assailed the legality of his arrest
via a “Motion to Dismiss” the Information, which he filed on
By Order of August 13, 2003, Branch
24 Presiding Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento,
Jr., herein respondent, “believ[ing]
that there [wa]s lack of preliminary investigation,”
ordered the remand of the case against Apura to the
Cebu City Prosecutor’s Office for preliminary investigation, and ordered Apura’s release from custody on a bail of P20,000. Respondent’s said Order reads:
Accused-movant Anthony John Apura alleged in his Motion to Dismiss
that his arrest was illegal because he [went] to the police station upon
invitation but immediately thereafter he was placed under custody of the
police. His arrest does not fall
under a warrantless arrest nor it is within the purview of “hot pursuit”
concept, considering that the subject incident happened on
The Court believes that there is lack of preliminary investigation on the part of accused Anthony John Apura. The warrant of arrest issued on July 24, 2003 on the basis of the original information filed on July 24, 2003 cannot be made as valid basis for the arrest of the accused Anthony John Apura on August 2, 2003. The court notes that accused Anthony John Apura is not the certain “Junjun” mentioned in the original Information.
What appalled the Court is the manner by which the accused was placed under custody. The actuation wherein a person is invited to the police station for investigation and to place said person under detention when his appearance therein was only to explain his side thereof, is foreboding.
WHEREFORE,
short of declaring the arrest of movant illegal, and acting on the Motion to
Dismiss, remand this case to the Cebu City Prosecution Office for Prosecutor
Jesus Feliciano to conduct preliminary investigation on Anthony John Apura and said accused is ordered released from
custody, being admitted to bail in the amount of PhP 20,000.000 in cash,
pending preliminary investigation, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule
112.
Furnish parties and counsels copy of this Order and Prosecutor Feliciano, who is directed to submit his preliminary investigation report sixty (60) days from today.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, arose the present
administrative complaint filed on
To the complaint, respondent gives
the following comment:
Respondent judge was trying to check the abuse committed by the State through its law enforcement agency upon the rights of an accused person guaranteed to him by no less than the Constitution. The inquest proceedings which followed . . . the “invitation” was [sic] highly irregular. The prosecutors knew this fact, which is why, during the hearing on the “Motion to Dismiss”, they agreed for [sic] the remand of the record for preliminary investigation.
Had he granted the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Apura because of the illegal arrest, accused would be released just the same. Yet, to strike a balance of the possible abuse on the rights of accused and the effort of the police at prosecution of crimes, respondent did not categorically declare the arrest illegal but allowed the accused to post cash bail bond with an accompanying “hold-departure” order. At least, to get hold of the accused while preliminary investigation is conducted.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By Report dated
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution,
recommended that respondent be fined
in the amount of P21,000 for gross ignorance of the law.[7]
By Resolution[8]
dated December 14, 2005, this Court ordered the parties to manifest whether
they are submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records already
filed and submitted, within ten days from notice. Respondent responded in the affirmative in a Manifestation[9] received
on
An application to bail from Murder,
for which Apura was indicted on
SEC.
8. Burden
of proof in bail application. – At
the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody of the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during
the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but,
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
in order to determine whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.[12]
In the case at bar, respondent
ordered Apura to be released on bail, without
conducting a prior hearing.
The lack of preliminary
investigation, in light of the finding that Apura was
not lawfully arrested without warrant, he having gone to the CIDGU in response
to its invitation, did not justify respondent’s disregard of the mandatory
procedure governing the grant of bail.
Indeed, a preliminary investigation
should have been conducted before the filing of the Amended
Information. A preliminary investigation
is a proceeding distinct from an inquest.
A preliminary investigation is “an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial.”[13] An inquest is “a summary inquiry conducted by
a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless
arrest of a person was based on probable cause.”[14]
Where the penalty prescribed by law for
an offense is at least four years, two months and one day of imprisonment
without regard to the fine, a preliminary investigation must be conducted
before the filing of a complaint or information for such offense.[15] The conduct of an inquest investigation does
not fulfill the requirement for the conduct of a preliminary investigation
before the filing of an information or complaint involving any such offenses, except
when the accused was lawfully arrested
without a warrant.[16]
In the case at bar, the accused was not
even arrested. He repaired to the CIDGU
on its invitation. He should thus have
been subjected to a preliminary investigation, not a mere inquest
investigation.[17]
An Amended Information was
subsequently filed, however, upon which a Warrant of Arrest was issued against Apura by Judge Taypin. By so issuing a warrant, Judge Taypin is presumed to have , before issuing the warrant, previously
regularly discharged his duty to personally determine the existence of probable
cause against the accused, as mandated by Section 6 of Rule 112, which
provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
At all events, the absence of a preliminary
investigation did not justify Apura’s release, the
defect not having nullified the information and the warrant of arrest against
him. Thus this Court held in Larranaga v. CA:[18]
We
hold, therefore, that petitioner’s detention at the
The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. (Citation omitted)
In fine, respondent’s release on bail
of Apura, without priorly
conducting a hearing for the purpose, betrays his gross ignorance of the law,
it being settled that where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of observance
thereof constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[20]
Gross ignorance of the law may be
punished with dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40.000.[21]
This Court, however, appreciates as
mitigating in respondent’s favor his issuance of a hold-departure order against
the accused.[22] It is in this light that it reduces the
recommended penalty of fine to P15,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., is
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000) Pesos, with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Vide
Revised Penal Code, Article 248.
[12] Basco v.
Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335,
[13] Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section 1.
[14] Bautista, Basic
Criminal Procedure, Rex Bookstore, Inc.:
[15] Supra note 13.
[16] Vide
Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section
7; Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644,
October 27, 1997, 281 SCRA 254, at 258.
[17] Vide Larannaga v.
Court of Appeals, supra.
[18] 351 Phil. 75, 90 (1998).
[19] G.R. No. L-72830,
[20] Jamora
v. Bersales, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529,
[21] A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, Sections 8 (9) and 11.
[22] Supra note
1 at 33-34.